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Although  cyclical  fluctuations  remain  a  problem  throughout  the  industrial 
world, the depression of  the 1930s was the last time that we experienced the 
kind of financial crisis followed by economic collapse that had been a recur- 
rent problem  in both  the United  States and Europe for centuries.  The long 
period of time since the last such crisis may explain why economists have paid 
relatively little attention to the subject in recent decades. 
Instead, economic research has focused on improving our understanding of 
the normal functioning of the economy and on developing policies that can 
make small but important improvements: bringing the inflation rate closer to 
zero, lowering the rate of unemployment, and reducing distortions in the use 
of resources.  In a $5 trillion economy, even “small” improvements in overall 
performance can be of enormous value. 
In contrast to most professional economists,  policy officials and leaders of 
the private business sector worry a great deal about the risk of major break- 
downs in the functioning  of  the economy.  Many of  the  conditions and the 
events  of  the  1980s-including  the  failure  of  most  of  the  less  developed 
debtor countries  to  service their  debts, the  deterioration  of  capital  among 
money-center banks,  the large numbers of  bankruptcies of the thrift institu- 
tions, the wide swings of currency exchange rates, the increase of corporate 
debt, and the stock market crash of  1987-have  contributed to the fear of  an 
impending major economic crisis.  Rapid changes in financial markets and a 
dramatic increase in the complexity of financial instruments have heightened 
those fears. 
We have graduated from the  1980s to the  1990s without any of those risks 
triggering  a major financial crisis  and economic  collapse.  Indeed, after an 
initial recession  eliminated  the inflationary  excesses of  the  late  1970s, the 
decade of the 1980s was a time of uninterrupted growth with stable inflation. 
But the risk of such an economic crisis remains. As Charles Kindleberger’s 
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distinguished and fascinating  book (Manias, Panics and  Crashes: A History 
of Financial  Crises [Basic Books,  19781) has ably demonstrated, economic 
crises have been with us as long as the market economy. At some point, greed 
overcomes fear and individual  investors take  greater risks  in the pursuit  of 
greater returns. A shock occurs and the market prices of assets begin to col- 
lapse. Bankruptcies of  leveraged  individuals  and institutions  follow. Banks 
and other financial  institutions  fail in these circumstances because  they are 
inherently leveraged.  The resulting failure of  the payments  mechanism  and 
the inability to create credit bring on an economic collapse. 
The potential source of financial crises is not the random excesses of inves- 
tors who take on too much debt and gamble in ventures that do not succeed. 
Problems  arise when large numbers of  market participants  are swept up in 
excessive  risk taking in the same types of investments, whether it be banks 
lending too much to developing countries, thrifts lending too much to real 
estate developers in saturated markets, or individuals  making  leveraged in- 
vestments in stocks or land at the top of a boom market. 
Similarly,  the reason  for social concern is not  that  some individuals  are 
financially hurt or even bankrupted by their bad investments. Individuals who 
take  risks in  the hopes of  big returns  must  face the risk of  commensurate 
losses. But a collapse of the financial institutions can hurt innocent depositors 
and, through the subsequent effect of  financial collapse on business activity, 
can lead to unemployment and the loss of otherwise healthy businesses. 
A pessimist might well believe that only the memory of bankruptcies deters 
excessive risk taking. As that collective memory fades with time, a new gen- 
eration of  investors takes on the excessive risks that lead to financial crisis. 
But an optimist would hope that improved understanding would lead to alter- 
native institutional  rules that prevent the excessive risk taking that leads to 
financial crises or, if  such crises begin, to policies that  limit the crises and 
prevent the evolution of economic collapse. 
The public interest in avoiding the failure of banks and other financial insti- 
tutions  argues strongly for government regulation  and supervision  of  these 
institutions. Even Adam Smith explicitly  advocated the regulation of  banks 
because he recognized  that their failure would have damaging effects on the 
economy more generally. 
The present  volume is part  of  a broader  NBER  study, discussed  in more 
detail in the preface, that aimed at increasing our understanding of the sources 
and propagation of economic crises and stimulating research on the general 
problem of reducing the risk of economic crisis. The volume divides the sub- 
ject into three parts: the origins of financial crises in domestic capital markets, 
the  international  origins and transmission  of  financial and economic crises, 
and the transition  from financial crises to economic collapse. For each part, 
an  insightful  background paper provides  an  analytic  discussion  of  relevant 
issues. 
Instead of  summarizing either the background papers or the conference pre- 3  Introduction 
sentations,  I want to look in this introduction at the four most important poten- 
tial economic crises that the United  States faced in the  1980s and see what 
lessons can be drawn, both  individually and collectively, from these experi- 
ences. I will focus particular attention on the role of the government both as a 
source of these problems and as a force in their resolution. Although the lim- 
ited space of an introduction  inevitably risks oversimplification,  I  hope that 
the basic implications  of our experience can emerge clearly from even this 
brief analysis. 
The Developing Country Debt Crisis 
The debt crisis for less developed countries (LDCs) began in the late sum- 
mer  of  1982 when  the  government  of  Mexico announced  that  it could  no 
longer pay the interest and principal on its international debt and could  not 
obtain  additional  funds from its  creditor  banks.  Within  months,  all of  the 
Latin American debtor nations reached a similar situation. During the decade 
that followed, economic growth in the debtor countries was significantly de- 
pressed. The major international banks have been forced to write off  substan- 
tial amounts of the LDC debt on their books, thereby reducing the capital of 
the banks and weakening the financial strength of  the industrial economies. 
The full impact of the debt crisis on the industrial nations remains to be seen. 
The origins of the LDC debt problem can usefully  be traced  to a decade 
before the 1982 crisis when the OPEC countries reduced the production of oil 
and raised the world price of crude oil from approximately $3 a barrel to more 
than $12 a barrel. The rise in the price of oil created a vast pool of new savings 
in the hands of the governments of the oil exporting countries. Although they 
would eventually spend some of these funds on raising their local standard of 
living, most of these so-called petrodollars were invested in financial assets. 
The major money-center banks played a primary role in this process, borrow- 
ing funds from the OPEC governments and lending them elsewhere. 
The U.S. government encouraged the American banks to recycle petrodol- 
lars to borrowers  in Latin America. Government officials saw these private 
credits  as a useful  supplement to American  foreign aid in  stimulating eco- 
nomic growth in Latin America. It was not difficult to find willing borrowers 
throughout  Latin  America  when  an excessively easy U.S.  monetary  policy 
from the middle of the 1970s to the end of the decade raised the rate of infla- 
tion and caused short-term real interest rates to be close to or even below zero. 
The major U.S. money-center banks financed the LDC loans not only with 
their petrodollar  deposits but  also by  syndicating the loans to regional  and 
local banks across the nation.  Those smaller banks could add the risky LDC 
loans to their portfolios without increasing their cost of deposits because de- 
positors were protected by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC). 
It might have been foreseen that real interest rates would eventually rise to 
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to service their dollar-denominated debts. It might also have been foreseen 
that the worldwide boom of the second half of the seventies would end, caus- 
ing a decline in the demand for the exports of the LDCs and in the prices of 
their export commodities. But the financial institutions were encouraged by 
the institutional setting-FDIC  guarantees for depositors and low capital re- 
quirements-to  give inadequate attention to these risks. These same condi- 
tions encouraged excessive risk taking in other countries as well where ex- 
plicit  or  implicit  government  protection  of  depositors  substituted for  the 
formal role of the FDIC. 
When the Federal Reserve finally took strong steps in 1979 to counter the 
rising rate of  inflation, real and nominal interest rates rose substantially and 
the U.S. economy experienced a pair of recessions that kept economic activity 
depressed from late 1979 until the end of  1982. In addition, the jump in real 
U.S. interest rates caused a sharp rise in the dollar, adding to the LDCs’ diffi- 
culty in servicing their dollar-denominated loans. The debtor countries were 
able to meet the higher debt service costs only by substantial increases in their 
borrowing, increases that were willingly provided by the major money-center 
banks as late as the spring of  1982. But within a few months after that date, 
the nature of  the debtors’ problems had become sufficiently clear that they 
were no longer able to obtain additional credit on a voluntary basis and there- 
fore were unable to service their debts. 
Although the bank loans to these countries were not a large proportion of 
the banks’ total lending, they were large relative to the capital of the banks. 
The potential losses to the banks if the debtors defaulted on their loans could 
significantly impair the capital of  the banks. Since the deposits of the major 
money-center banks are primarily the large corporate deposits that are not 
formally insured by the FDIC, the impairment of the banks’ capital entailed a 
serious risk that depositors would remove their funds from these banks. Such 
deposits could have been placed instead in foreign banks or invested directly 
in government securities. Major bank runs of this type could have destabilized 
the financial system and the economy more generally. To prevent such a col- 
lapse, the governments and money-center banks of the major industrial coun- 
tries pursued the strategy of preventing default by lending some or all of the 
amounts needed to pay the interest on those loans. The United States and other 
governments were important not only in providing bridge loans until private 
financing could be arranged but also in pressuring the private lenders to pro- 
vide new loans and to roll over old loans as they became due. Without such 
government pressure, the problem of “free-rider’’ banks that would want their 
old loans repaid but that refused to provide new  funds would have led to a 
formal collapse of the repayment and lending process. 
This strategy permitted the banks to claim that their LDC loans would even- 
tually be fully repaid and to use the time to accumulate substantial reserves 
and additions to their capital. These developments prevented the bank runs 
that many feared when the LDC crisis began. 5  Introduction 
By  1989 the major money-center banks in the United States and elsewhere 
had accumulated large reserves and made explicit provisions for substantial 
losses on their LDC loans. At that point, Treasury Secretary Nicholas Brady 
proposed that the banks assist the debtor nations by  accepting lower interest 
rates or substantial principal write-downs. Negotiations with Mexico, Vene- 
zuela, and the Philippines have been completed on this basis. It is generally 
expected that this will set the pattern for the negotiations with the other major 
debtor countries. 
Looking back over the period of nearly a decade since the collapse of vol- 
untary lending to the LDC debtor countries, the developments to date are cer- 
tainly less cataclysmic than many initially feared. The failure of the debtors to 
repay their loans has not led to the collapse of U.S.  money-center banks, and 
the runs on those banks did not occur. Nor have the debtor countries seen an 
economic collapse triggered by  the withdrawal of  international credit or by 
the need to make tough domestic adjustments to reduce current account defi- 
cits. Although the process of  adjustment was painful for the debtor countries, 
the experience may have been the catalyst that caused the fundamental eco- 
nomic reforms in Mexico and elsewhere that now hold the promise of better 
economic performance in the decade ahead. 
But the problems and risks created by  the LDC debts are far from over. 
Most of the Latin America bank debt is valued on the secondary market at less 
than fifty cents per dollar of debt. Brazil and Argentina, the two largest debt- 
ors after Mexico, have yet to conclude satisfactory arrangements. The major 
money-center banks around the world remain weaker because of  the write- 
downs that they have had to make. Their capital has been reduced by the need 
to record losses and to reserve for possible future losses. The equity markets’ 
evaluation of bank stocks makes new equity capital exceedingly expensive to 
obtain. 
Even more serious, the cost of  deposits and other debt funds to the U.S. 
money-center banks has been increased substantially by  the perception that 
such deposits and investments involve much greater credit risks than they did 
in the past. It is particularly significant that the cost of funds to money-center 
banks-reflecting  not only the interest rates that they pay but also their man- 
datory capital requirements, FDIC premiums and reserve requirements-ex- 
ceeds the cost of funds to major nonbank companies. These nonbank borrow- 
ers therefore bypass the banks and borrow directly from the capital markets 
by  issuing commercial paper and corporate bonds. The banks can lend only to 
smaller companies and those with lower credit quality. This further increases 
the perceived riskiness of banks as debtors and therefore increases their cost 
of funds. This vicious cycle of declining portfolio quality and increasing cost 
of bank funds is a subject to which I shall return below. 
Although it would be unwise to draw final conclusions from this experience 
before the existing problems are fully resolved, four general observations are 
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debtor nations and massive runs by the creditors of the money-center banks. 
Although neither of these occurred on a scale that created a financial crisis or 
economic collapse, both did occur in more attenuated ways that left the banks 
weaker than they were when the 1980s began.  Debt write-downs,  debt-for- 
equity swaps, and interest rate reductions  have reduced the capital of  many 
U.S. and foreign banks. Creditors have not abandoned the U.S. money-center 
banks but now require relatively high rates of return  to compensate  for the 
increased risk. The banks have made efforts to increase capital and reserves 
but they continue to face new challenges.  The danger remains that, in their 
weakened condition, their current capital and reserves  may  not be adequate 
for the challenges that lie ahead. 
Second, the serious risks created by excessive LDC debt reflect the concen- 
tration of that debt in banks.  If  the debt had been in the form of  bonds that 
were  widely  disbursed  in  individual  and  institutional portfolios,  the  losses 
associated with the failure of the debtors to pay interest and principal would 
not have caused the risks to the financial system that have resulted  from the 
concentration  of the loans in the banking  system. That is true even though 
more widely distributed ownership of the debt might have precluded the pro- 
vision of additional credits and thus led to greater defaults. 
Third, the concentration of  the debt in banks was exacerbated by govern- 
ment policies: the explicit encouragement to banks to recycle petrodollars to 
developing  countries, the  inadequate  supervision of  bank  lending,  and  the 
provision of FDIC insurance that permitted small and medium-sized banks to 
finance LDC loans with low-cost insured deposits. 
Fourth, the  high  and  rising  inflation  rates  of  the  1970s encouraged  the 
debtor countries to borrow excessively by temporarily depressing real interest 
rates. Without the rise in inflation, the accumulation of debt might have been 
much more modest. 
The 1987 Stock Market Crash 
The dramatic crash of the stock market in October  1987 was the kind  of 
event that many in business and government had worried might start a wider 
financial crisis and economic collapse. In the immediate aftermath of the mar- 
ket’s decline it was  natural  for the press  and the public to think  about the 
events  of  1929 and the  subsequent  depression.  Such reflection  raised  two 
questions:  Would  the  1987  stock  market  crash  initiate  a  major economic 
downturn? What policies might be pursued to reduce the likelihood of such 
stock market collapses in the future? 
The stock market crash did not precipitate a recession, let alone the kind of 
major downturn that many had feared. Within six months, the economy was 
gaining strength and real GNP rose by more than four percent in 1988. Why 
were we so fortunate? 7  Introduction 
It is difficult enough in economics to know why some unique event has 
happened. It is harder still to explain with any confidence why something has 
not happened. I can only speculate on the importance of two possible reasons. 
First was the absence of widespread bankruptcies. Although the household 
sector as a whole lost more than $1 trillion of wealth, there were few personal 
or institutional bankruptcies. American banks, unlike those in Germany and 
Japan, do not have extensive equity investments. Margin requirements dis- 
courage  individuals from  buying  stock with  borrowed  funds to  the point 
where a major downturn would cause personal bankruptcy. Even the securities 
firms that found their liquidity impaired by the market decline were protected 
from bankruptcy by loans that the commercial banks were encouraged by the 
Federal Reserve to provide. 
The absence of widespread bankruptcies was important in limiting the eco- 
nomic impact of  the stock market decline. An individual who incurs a large 
capital loss but remains solvent will respond by reducing his spending over a 
large number of years, while a bankrupt individual will be forced to cut cur- 
rent spending much more sharply. Widespread bankruptcies of financial insti- 
tutions could destroy the deposits of individuals who had not thought they 
were taking any risks and could impair the ability of the financial system to 
provide credit. 
Second was the provision of liquidity by the Federal Reserve. Immediately 
after the stock market crash, Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan an- 
nounced that the Federal Reserve would provide the increased liquidity de- 
manded by the private sector. The Treasury supported this position by  aban- 
doning explicitly the goal of  defending the international value of  the dollar 
that it had pursued during the year before the stock market crash. In practice, 
the Federal Reserve expanded the money supply and permitted short-term in- 
terest rates to decline. The Federal Reserve had clearly learned from the stud- 
ies of the 1930s, when its reduction of the money supply after the stock mar- 
ket crash exacerbated the economic decline. 
There was much finger pointing in  the search for the causes of  the stock 
market’s sharp decline and, therefore, for ways of reducing the likelihood of 
such declines in the future. The two principal suspects were the government 
and the institutional investors. 
The Federal Reserve and the Treasury were blamed for pursuing an inap- 
propriately tight monetary policy aimed at preventing a decline of the dollar. 
When an enlarged trade deficit was announced in early October, financial mar- 
kets assumed that the Federal Reserve would again tighten monetary policy to 
defend the dollar. This caused interest rates to rise even before the Federal 
Reserve took any action. High interest rates reduced share prices directly by 
lowering the present value of any stream of future dividends and indirectly by 
increasing the risk of recession and therefore of a decline in profits. 
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by  its repeated assertions about the importance of  the economic policies of 
foreign governments for the health of the U.S.  economy. When Germany and 
Japan indicated in October 1987 that they would not follow the policy direc- 
tions that Washington wanted, financial markets interpreted that as an omi- 
nous development. The failure of the government to deal with the U.S. budget 
deficit as the 1988 fiscal year began also contributed to the rise of interest rates 
and a general unease about the economic future. 
Institutional portfolio managers were blamed for program trading strategies 
that involved selling stock as equity prices fell. These program trading strate- 
gies probably encouraged a higher precrash level of share prices and acceler- 
ated the decline as share prices began to fall. The ability to pursue such strat- 
egies was assisted by the development of trading in index futures, which in 
turn was facilitated by  the use of computers to manage and execute orders. 
These are irreversible technical developments that cannot be legislated away. 
Although there have been some changes in financial regulations and in mar- 
gin requirements in the wake of the stock market decline, the resiliency of the 
economy in  1988 and 1989 eliminated any sense of the urgency and even of 
the desirability of such reforms. 
What lessons can be learned from this experience? First, the crash reminded 
us of the inherent volatility of equity markets. The stock market in every ma- 
jor country except Japan fell sharply in late 1987 and the Japanese market fell 
by  nearly 50 percent in  1990. Individual investors and government policy- 
makers must take that volatility as a starting point in all private and public 
decisions. 
Second, structuring the ownership of equities so that even a major decline 
in share prices does not cause widespread bankruptcies and impair the finan- 
cial system itself is important in limiting the damage of a stock market crash. 
Third, a better set of macroeconomic policies-a  smaller budget deficit and 
a monetary policy guided by domestic conditions rather than exchange rate 
targets-might  have reduced the risk of the market decline. The Fed-Treasury 
decision to respond to the market crash by increasing liquidity, publicly stated 
in a reassuring way,  probably contributed to the relatively modest economic 
consequences. 
Fourth,  although the “back door” financial help that the Federal Reserve 
gave to the securities firms through the commercial banks reduced the risk of 
an even steeper fall in share prices and of  the bankruptcy of  some financial 
institutions, the  policy  of  pressuring commercial banks  to make high  risk 
loans weakens the ability of the Fed to hold banks’ managements accountable 
for their lending decisions. Fortunately, this time the loans were repaid, and 
the banks were unscathed by  these additional risks.  But the precedent is a 
worrying one. In addition, the active role of the Federal Reserve in protecting 
securities firms that were on the brink of  collapse may make the securities 
firms even less cautious in their future asset and liability decisions. 9  Introduction 
Failures of the Savings and Loan Institutions 
The widespread failures of savings and loan institutions remains a subject 
of  general public  concern, not least because the taxpayers are being  called 
upon  to  finance  hundreds  of  billions  of  dollars  of  rescue  costs. Although 
widely referred to as a “bailout” of the savings and loan institutions, it is in 
fact a rescue for the depositors, making good on the promise of  the Federal 
Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation  (FSLIC), which ran  out of  funds 
early in  the process.  The savings and loans that become  insolvent are fre- 
quently closed, their senior managements lose their jobs, and their sharehold- 
ers lose the entire value of their investments. 
The savings and loan problem is still far from resolved. The recently  cre- 
ated Resolution Trust Corporation (RTC) is actively acquiring insolvent thrifts 
and using borrowed  funds, for which  taxpayers will ultimately  be account- 
able, to fill the gap between the market value of the thrifts’ assets and their 
liabilities to depositors. Estimates of the eventual cost of this program of pro- 
tecting depositors are uncertain  and frequently revised  upward,  but an esti- 
mate of $200 billion plus the interest on the incurred debt would not be re- 
garded as unduly pessimistic. 
Why did this $200 billion problem occur? Instead of  a single reason there 
is a series of  interrelated  mistakes that has led to the current situation. The 
root  cause of the problem  was the rapid  inflation  of  the  1970s. The rising 
inflation rate caused a substantial rise in the interest rates paid to depositors 
and charged on new mortgages. Since most thrift institutions held only fixed 
interest rate mortgages, the market value of their mortgages fell so much that 
they were worth less than the value of their deposits and other obligations. To 
make matters worse, the interest that the thrift paid each year to depositors 
and other creditors  exceeded the interest that it collected on its portfolio of 
existing mortgages. In short, these thrifts had a negative net worth and were 
losing more money each year. 
Congress  responded  to these  problems  by  enacting  a series of  measures 
designed to permit the troubled thrifts to survive in the hope that they would 
eventually become solvent again. This approach was based on the fact that, 
although old mortgages  did not pay  enough to cover current interest costs, 
new mortgages carried interest rates that exceeded the cost of funds. As old 
mortgages matured and were replaced by new ones, the thrifts would become 
profitable.  This process could be helped, Congress reasoned, by faster growth 
of the thrifts and by investments in higher yielding assets. 
To  permit that rapid growth, Congress relaxed the minimum capital stan- 
dards for thrifts, permitting them to increase their size without adding to their 
equity  capital. The method  of  historic  cost accounting  permitted  thrifts  to 
keep old mortgages on their books at face value, not reflecting the decline in 
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thrifts had little or nothing invested in their institutions. They had no capital 
to lose if the thrift failed but much to gain if high-yield, high-risk investments 
were successful. 
Congress permitted  the thrift managements to succumb to this temptation 
to take substantially  greater risks with their investments by relaxing the re- 
strictions on permissible  thrift assets.  Instead  of requiring that virtually  all 
funds be invested in residential mortgages, thrifts were allowed to make much 
riskier and higher yielding investments.  In a few cases, the thrift institution 
invested in almost nothing but high yield corporate “junk bonds.” Because of 
the government’s promise to protect the depositors through FSLIC, the thrifts’ 
ability to attract funds was unaffected  by the increased riskiness of  their in- 
vestments. The difference between the high interest rates paid on junk bonds 
and other high-risk investments and the low cost of insured deposits temporar- 
ily made this a very profitable activity. 
To  make it even easier for the thrifts to attract funds, Congress voted  to 
increase the FSLIC guarantee to $100,000 per account. Thrifts eager to grow 
rapidly worked with securities firms to “broker” insured deposits. A securities 
broker would help an individual who had $1 million to invest in short-term 
deposits to buy ten $100,000 certificates of deposit from ten different thrifts, 
thus combining high yield with the complete security of government insur- 
ance. Thrifts could also use the method of brokered deposits to compete for 
large institutional pension accounts since the $100,000 FSLIC guarantee limit 
was applied to each individual participant in the pension plan. 
In the end, Congress’s gamble failed. Too many of the high risk loans made 
by the thrifts defaulted. While some of these bad investments reflected inap- 
propriate self-dealing or even criminal activity, the failures were generally due 
to the excessive risks accepted in pursuit of higher yields. 
The likelihood of such failures was very great in a setting where neither the 
depositors nor the equity owners of the thrifts had much to lose and where the 
equity owners and the management decision makers had the potential for sub- 
stantial gains if their gambles were successful. 
Moreover, since all thrifts were seeking to lend money for real estate devel- 
opment (including  not only residential  properties  but  also commercial  real 
estate of all kinds), there was an inherent tendency to overbuilding. This was 
exacerbated  by  the tax rules of the early  1980s that encouraged  real estate 
investments by generous depreciation allowances. 
The process came to an end when it became clear that the mortgage borrow- 
ers for many commercial real estate investments were unable to service their 
debts. Faced with negative net worth, the thrifts were not able to pay off their 
depositors by selling their remaining mortgages in the secondary market. The 
FSLIC was forced to close those institutions or merge them into healthy insti- 
tutions and to compensate the depositors or the acquiring thrifts. The extent 
of  the problem  was so great that the FSLIC assets were insufficient to deal 11  Introduction 
with all of the insolvent thrifts. Congress voted to back the FSLIC guarantee 
with whatever government funds would be needed. 
The Resolution Trust Corporation is now in the process of making good on 
that guarantee by acquiring ailing thrifts and closing them or selling them to 
other institutions.  In many cases, the RTC is keeping the mortgages and fore- 
closed real estate for subsequent disposition and selling the thrift as a network 
of branches.  The RTC then pays the purchaser the value of the deposit liabili- 
ties being assumed less a small premium for the value of  the branches and the 
associated deposit-gathering  and mortgage-lending capability. 
The Office of Thrift Supervision, acting on the basis of recent legislation, 
is now requiring much higher capital levels of the thrift institutions and limit- 
ing the types of investments that they can make. Supervisors are also requiring 
that,  when  thrifts  have  assets of  uncertain  value,  they  establish  reserves 
against the risk of  future defaults, a process that reduces the thrift’s capital 
available to meet certain of  the new minimum capital requirements. The result 
of all of this has been to force many more thrift institutions into positions of 
insolvency or capital inadequacy. 
Before trying to draw some general lessons from this experience, it is worth 
asking what would have happened if the government had taken the position 
that once the FSLIC had exhausted its funds no further compensation  to the 
depositors at failed thrifts would be available. 
There would of course have been the financial hardship to many of the de- 
positors of the institutions that became insolvent.  Those depositors that had 
spread their savings among several institutions might have suffered relatively 
small losses, but others could see their entire savings wiped out. A compro- 
mise  solution in which the government compensated  depositors  only up to 
some lower limit once the FSLIC fund was exhausted (say $50,000 per house- 
hold instead of $100,000  per account) would have prevented hardship to small 
savers but  not to those larger investors who had used the route of brokered 
deposits. 
But any decision  not to provide the full insurance benefits  that had been 
promised by FSLIC might have started runs on all thrift institutions, including 
those with adequate capital and reserves.  Although the risks of the resulting 
disintermediation are unclear,  it  is certainly  possible  that  the thrifts  would 
have  been  able to retain  substantial  deposits by purchasing  private deposit 
insurance (analogous to the insurance  on local  government  bonds  and  on 
mortgages) or by  paying  higher interest  rates  in the same way that  money 
market mutual funds do for their uninsured deposits. It is possible, however, 
that  there  would  be  widespread  failures of  thrifts  and an  end to thrifts  as 
deposit-taking  institutions  of  the type that  we have today. If  they could  not 
attract depositors, their portfolios of mortgages would in the end be acquired 
by mutual-fund-type organizations at prices low enough to ensure that the re- 
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tinue to act as mortgage originators but would be forced to sell all of their new 
mortgages to mutual-fund-type organizations. The perceived risk of providing 
funds to finance mortgages would increase, causing the interest rates charged 
on mortgages to rise, perhaps substantially. This in turn could lead to a sub- 
stantial  decline  in  housing  construction  and  a  temporary  economic  de- 
cline. 
The risks would have been even greater if the failure of the FSLIC to honor 
its commitments caused depositors to distrust the FDIC guarantee of  bank 
deposits. The resulting runs on bank deposits and disintermediation of funds 
from the banking system would have much more severe effects on economic 
activity. While single-family mortgages are a relatively homogeneous product 
that are easily securitized, that is not true of the commercial loans that consti- 
tute the primary business of commercial banks. Eventually banks would no 
doubt be able to attract uninsured deposits by  having much higher capital ra- 
tios and paying substantially higher real interest rates, but the period of tran- 
sition could be a difficult and painful one. 
Three very brief conclusions emerge from this brief summary of the thrift 
crisis. First, without the substantial rise in inflation from the mid-1960s to the 
end of  the 1970s the problem would probably never have occurred. Interest 
rates would have remained low and the thrifts would have been able to attract 
funds to finance mortgages at those low interest rates. 
Second, deregulation of interest ceilings, reductions in capital requirements 
and  a broadening of  permissible asset investments led to excessively risky 
lending and virtually unlimited leverage because capital requirements were so 
low and creditors were insulated from risk by  the FSLIC. The problem was 
not deregulation as such but the combination of deregulation (of interest rates, 
asset composition and capital) with government guarantees to depositors. 
Third, once the crisis began the government was forced to provide full in- 
surance payments even after the insurance fund was bankrupt; this action was 
motivated by the fear of the systemic damage to confidence that would result 
from a failure to pay and of the economic consequences of the disintermedia- 
tion that would result. Any transition to the narrower scope of  government 
deposit insurance that many have urged must be done slowly if  it is to avoid 
such risks of rapid disintermediation. 
Commercial Bank Failures 
Although the spotlight of public attention has focused on the thrift institu- 
tions, the risk of commercial bank failures is, if anything, an even more irn- 
portant problem for the economy because of the more central role that banks 
When oil prices fell sharply in 1986, all of the major banks in Texas failed. 
Now  declining real  estate values in  New  England  and in  the  mid-Atlantic 
states threaten bank  solvency in those areas. The very  low prices of  bank 
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shares relative to their reported earnings and the very high yields on the bonds 
of some major banks indicate financial analysts’ concerns that earnings will 
not be maintained or that the banks will actually fail. 
Why has this happened? Why are bank failures more frequent now than in 
past times, even when the economy is not in recession? How will government 
policies affect these risks in the future? 
I have already noted that the LDC debt problem eroded bank capital and 
raised the cost of funds to banks. This reduced the ability of banks to provide 
loans to high-quality corporate borrowers for whom  it  is less expensive to 
raise funds directly in capital markets (through bonds and commercial paper) 
or from nonbank institutions like insurance companies and leasing companies. 
Without these high-quality corporate borrowers, banks have been driven to do 
more real estate lending than they did in the past. 
The banks’ desire to increase real estate lending came at a time when tax 
legislation  greatly  increased  the  attractiveness of  investing in  multifamily 
housing,  in individual condominiums, and in commercial real estate of  all 
kinds. The result has been serious overbuilding of  office buildings, hotels, 
shopping centers, and apartment buildings. Although each prospective project 
seemed attractive on the basis of the existing stock of real estate and the asso- 
ciated level of rents, when all of the new buildings became available the rent 
levels were depressed. 
The problem was exacerbated by the shifting regional pattern of economic 
weakness. The oil price declines of  the mid-1980s sharply reduced the de- 
mand for all kinds of real estate in Texas and Oklahoma. More recently, the 
New England economy has suffered from the simultaneous decline of demand 
for the products of  the defense, computer, and financial services industries. 
The result is a fall in rent levels and occupancy rates in New England. 
The banks as holders of the mortgages on these properties found their earn- 
ings and balance sheets severely impaired. The high leverage ratios of banks 
in which equity capital is typically only about 5 percent of total assets means 
that unanticipated losses equal to only a few percent of total assets can leave 
the bank insolvent. 
But the problem of the commercial banks is more fundamental than just the 
results of excessive lending to developing countries and real estate investors. 
Banks are in trouble because they have lost the low cost sources of funds in 
savings and checking accounts that traditionally allowed them to concentrate 
their lending on low-risk high-quality borrowers. 
Of particular importance was the loss of the zero-interest checking account 
balances and low-interest savings accounts that were the basic sources of bank 
funds when the 1970s began. The rising rate of inflation in the 1970s and the 
associated increases in interest rates brought that to an end. The introduction 
of money market mutual funds that allowed relatively small savers to get high 
market interest rates forced banks to raise interest rates in order not to lose 
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funds forced banks to pay interest on checking accounts. These changes re- 
quired relaxation of  regulations on bank interest rates, but these regulatory 
changes  simply  followed  the  market  pressures.  Without  the  regulatory 
changes, the banks would not have been able to hold their deposits at all. 
The low-cost captive funds that had sustained banks in the past were gone. 
Banks had to compete directly with nonbank institutions and with the capital 
market for the business of  the better credit risks and for pools of  residential 
mortgages.  Although the FDIC guarantees keep the cost of  deposits lower 
than they would otherwise be, the overall cost of bank funds relative to the 
cost of  funds provided by  life insurance companies or mutual funds is in- 
creased by the premiums that the banks pay for their FDIC protection, by the 
need to maintain reserves with the Federal Reserve, and by the requirement to 
have at least a specified minimum investment of equity capital per dollar of 
assets. 
This change in the cost of funds is changing the role of banks in our econ- 
omy and, in the process, has created an excess number of banks. The large 
number of independent banks and of branches of individual banks keeps costs 
higher than they would be in a system with fewer banks and branches. The 
problems of the regional banks as economic downturns have shifted from one 
area of  the country  to  another has highlighted the advantage that national 
banks would have in pooling their risks. 
The process of bank consolidation that would reduce costs and risks is ham- 
pered, however, by the increased capital requirements recently agreed to at the 
Bank for International Settlements (BIS) meeting of the major central banks 
and now incorporated into U.S.  banking regulations. Since few banks have 
extra capital, they are not able to acquire banks that have inadequate capital. 
The legislative rules separating banking and commerce make it impossible for 
nonbank corporations to acquire undercapitalized banks. As a result, a num- 
ber of banks with inadequate capital are likely to fail. 
The regulatory pressure on banks to increase their capital is also making 
banks reluctant to make new loans. This reluctance is increased by the banks’ 
uncertainty about the amount by  which the recent tightening of  supervisory 
standards and the accompanying decline in real estate values will force them 
to add to their reserves against possible future loan losses. Banks are therefore 
reducing their lending and the amounts of their deposits in order to increase 
their capital-asset ratios. This process of bank-led disintermediation is making 
it  more difficult for small and medium-size businesses to borrow and may 
restrict the amount of  such credit when economic activity and therefore loan 
demand start to increase. 
The combination of  tougher supervisory standards and higher capital re- 
quirements may also limit the Federal Reserve’s ability to expand bank credit 
through open market purchases of  securities. Traditional expansionary open 
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to a substantial multiple of the funds that the Fed injects by its open market 
operations. But if all banks were to be at the minimum  capital levels,  they 
could not expand their total deposits and total assets. Open market operations 
could succeed only in substituting private loans for government securities in 
banks’ portfolios, a much less powerful impact on the economy. Indeed, risk- 
based  capital requirements could prevent  even  that  small  stimulative  effect 
since banks do not need capital against government securities to satisfy risk- 
based capital standards but would need additional capital if those government 
bonds were replaced by private loans. 
In short, the developments of  the past decade have produced a situation in 
which bank failures have increased and further failures are likely among insti- 
tutions that have been driven to operate with higher leverage and lower-quality 
assets than they did in the past. Bank lending is restrained by a lack of capital 
and  by  the  need  to accumulate reserves against possible  future loan losses. 
The central role of banks in our payments system and in providing credit to 
those businesses that cannot have direct  access to the credit markets makes 
such a weakening of the banking system a source of concern for the long-run 
health of  the economy. 
In  addition,  widespread  bank  failures could  trigger  a  major  economic 
downturn, even if the FDIC protected  the value of deposits, because of the 
resulting cutback in business lending. As banks failed, their creditors and the 
FDIC would seek to collect existing loans. While some borrowers would be 
able to shift to other banks, the ability to borrow is often based on informal 
information  that is difficult  to transfer.  This would  be particularly  true for 
smaller and middle sized borrowers. In an environment of banking failures, 
those banks that survive would be reluctant to take extensive risks with new 
customers. While everything could eventually be resolved with the same total 
lending and economic activity being supported by a smaller number of healthy 
national banks, the transition  could see such a reduction of credit that eco- 
nomic activity would be severely curtailed. 
The banking system as a whole is a “public good” that benefits the nation 
over and above the profits that it earns for the banks’ shareholders.  Systemic 
risks to the banking system are risks for the nation as a whole. Although the 
managements and shareholders of  individual institutions are, of  course, eager 
to protect the solvency of their own institutions,  they do not adequately take 
into account the adverse effects to the nation of systemic failure. Banks left to 
themselves  will  accept more risk  than  is optimal  from a  systemic  point of 
view. That is the basic case for government regulation of banking activity and 
the establishment of capital requirements. 
But government rules that require more capital and less risky  lending re- 
duce the rate of return on bank capital and thus make it difficult for the banks 
to  attract new capital. If  banks cannot earn the same after-tax rate of  return 
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sustain the banking industry. Some increases in pretax returns will no doubt 
come about from shrinking the number of banks and thus taking advantage of 
the economies of scale in administration. But in the end, if the after-tax rate 
of return on capital in banking at the required capital ratios and risk limitations 
is too low,  the supply of banking services in the United States will decline. 
Businesses with access to the capital markets will borrow directly. Smaller 
businesses may find that they are at such a disadvantage in raising capital that 
they will not survive and will be acquired by larger businesses with access to 
capital. 
Such dire developments are not inevitable. Institutions and regulations may 
evolve so that banks can lend based on uninsured deposits with lower capital 
requirements or, like their European counterparts, with equity participation. 
Tax  rules or the reserve requirements may change to improve the after-tax 
return on banking capital. 
All of this is, I hope, a far too pessimistic view of what could happen. The 
problems of the banks have not yet reached a stage where we can predict the 
future or draw conclusions about the past with confidence. But, looking back, 
several things stand out. 
First, inflation caused financial innovations that eliminated the sources of 
low-cost bank capital needed for banks to lend to the high-quality low-risk 
borrowers that have direct access to the capital market. 
Second, the combination of the increased cost of funds and the additional 
burdens imposed by  government regulations (capital requirements, Federal 
Reserve requirements, and FDIC charges) force many banks to compete for 
relatively high-risk businesses, at least as a part of their portfolio. 
Third,  insured depositors  provide funds to  the  banks without  worrying 
about the riskiness of the banks’ assets because of the FDIC insurance. Major 
corporate depositors at the larger banks also give less attention to the riskiness 
of  the banks’ assets because of  the implicit guarantee to uninsured deposits 
that results from the too-big-to-fail doctrine that appears to guide government 
policy. 
Fourth, the government is seeking to limit excessive risk taking by  banks 
through tougher  supervisory standards and  increased capital requirements. 
But this takes place in a competitive environment that forces banks to increase 
their risk taking because they can no longer compete for the low-risk loans 
that are now provided directly by  the capital markets and because the high 
cost of funds requires correspondingly higher returns on their assets. 
Fifth, the need for more bank capital per dollar of assets may continue to be 
frustrated by  competitive market pressures that limit the ability of banks to 
attract capital unless they can increase the after-tax rate of  return that they 
earn on that capital. 
The result of all of  this is a much higher level of risk at the center of  our 
financial system, and, therefore,  of  the economy itself, than existed in the 
past. How well this will work in the years ahead remains to be seen. 17  Introduction 
Some Conclusions 
In the decade of the 1980s the United States faced four major shocks to its 
financial sector and to the economy more generally. Each of these threatened 
to precipitate a financial crisis and a major economic downturn. Fortunately, 
none of these dangers materialized. 
But looking back at these problems,  the overall impression is that we face 
greater risks now  than  we appeared  to a decade ago. My analysis of  these 
problems also suggests that the major source of the increased risk in our econ- 
omy has been a series of  seemingly well-intentioned  government policies. 
A primary  culprit identified in each of the four cases has been the rising 
inflation  rate that resulted  from the monetary and fiscal policies of the  late 
1960s and the second half of the 1970s. Inflation distorted real interest rates, 
led to excessive borrowing by LDCs, caused thrift institutions with fixed rate 
mortgages to become insolvent, and created fundamental changes in the com- 
mercial banking sector. All too often during the period of rising inflation econ- 
omists misunderstood the serious and far-ranging adverse effects of inflation. 
A stable and low rate of inflation would have avoided many of the problems 
that have increased the risk of economic crisis. 
Changes  in  government  policies  aimed  at meeting new economic condi- 
tions have frequently added to the risks of economic crisis. These included the 
government’s urging  of  private  banks  to recycle  petrodollars to developing 
countries in the 1970s (and may include recent government pressure on banks 
to forgive substantial amounts of  that debt), attempts at international policy 
coordination and exchange rate management  (which not only contributed to 
the U.S.  stock market crash of 1987 but may, by pressuring the Japanese mon- 
etary authorities into an easy monetary policy after 1987, have contributed to 
the collapse of Japanese share prices in 1990, which has weakened their bank- 
ing system), and the relaxation of regulatory and capital standards on the thrift 
institutions that encouraged excessive risk taking. The consequences of insti- 
tutional and regulatory arrangements are often hard to predict and create pres- 
sures that add to systemic risk. 
This is certainly  not to say that all government actions in the  1980s have 
increased the risk of economic crisis. The Federal Reserve brought down the 
high rate of inflation inherited from the 1970s, cajoled the commercial banks 
to provide enough additional lending to avoid widespread default of the LDC 
debts, and provided liquidity after the stock market crash. The government, 
through the FDIC, prevented the collapse of a major money-center bank and, 
through the RTC, has prevented  a collapse of  the thrift  industry. Other ex- 
amples could be added. But in virtually every case the government appears to 
be correcting  problems of its own making and possibly  sowing the seeds of 
future problems. 
The robustness of the American financial system depends on its ability to 
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adequate diversification of investments relative to existing capital. Greater di- 
versification of  assets would  have  avoided  some of  the most  serious  risks 
faced in the 1980s. If LDC debts had been in the form of bonds held by indi- 
vidual  and institutional  investors instead  of  by  the commercial banks, the 
losses incurred by these investors would have created no risk to the financial 
system as a whole. If commercial banks had geographically diversified loan 
portfolios, the regional problems of the American economy would not have 
threatened their solvency. 
There are many potential sources of economic crises and much that can be 
done to  reduce future risks. But a low rate of  inflation,  stable government 
policies, and an institutional environment that encourages sufficient diversifi- 
cation of risks can play a fundamental role in reducing the risk of future eco- 
nomic crises. 